Host country policies shape the incentives and opportunities of MNC subsidiaries to innovate. While strategy and international business literature has broadly acknowledged government action as an important factor for knowledge creation in MNC subsidiaries, we have scant evidence for the precise link between technology policy and MNC subsidiary innovation investment decisions and their outcomes. In this study, we investigate whether domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries respond differently to R&D subsidies, an important dimension of technology policy, by integrating theory from subsidy additionality literature into models of MNC subsidiary innovation. Based on longitudinal data from Germany, we find that foreign MNC subsidiaries increase their R&D investments more than comparable domestic firms in response to an R&D subsidy. Moreover, MNC subsidiaries experience comparatively stronger effects in innovation performance from subsidy-induced R&D since they have more opportunities to recombine knowledge within the MNC. However, subsidies also shift away the attention from the subsidiaries' original R&D activities. Our findings have implications for both MNC subsidiaries and policy makers who seek to attract foreign R&D investment in a host country.
INTRODUCTION
Favorable host country policies are a key determinant for multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries to expand their activities towards becoming increasingly innovative or explorative (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) . Extant literature has mostly studied the role of host country institutions, defining the "rules of the game" and as such establishing the basis for economic activities (North, 1990; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2012) . Despite the interest in institutions, strategy and international business scholars have paid little attention to the direct effects that government policies have on MNC subsidiaries. In this paper, we focus on R&D subsidies, an important dimension of a host country's technology policy, enacted by governments to foster the innovative activities of firms within an institutional context. More precisely, we study how receipts of R&D subsidies affect the R&D investment decisions of foreign MNC subsidiaries as well as their effects on innovation performance, using domestic firms as comparison groups.
Technology policy influences the incentives, capabilities, and resources available for firms and other actors to finance or participate in the development, integration and commercialization of knowledge (Holmes et al., 2016) . The effects of technology policy, in turn, depend on the strategic response of firms, and firms may respond differently to technology policy. By integrating theoretical mechanisms from the literature on additionality effects of R&D subsidies (e.g., Blanes and Busom, 2004; Clarysse, Wright, and Mustar, 2009 ) with theory on MNC subsidiary R&D decisions (e.g., Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Un and CuervoCazurra, 2008; Santangelo, Meyer, and Jindra, 2016) , we explore systematic differences between domestic firms and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs in their reaction to host country R&D subsidies. We predict differential effects on R&D investment decisions in the host country following the subsidy. Moreover, we argue that domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries differ in the extent pact on domestic firms versus foreign MNC subsidiaries. This question is important at a theoretical level because if domestic firms and foreign MNC subsidiaries do not differ in their response to technology policy, then theories on R&D additionality also extend to MNCs. While prior literature offers only limited guidance, it has identified differences in the R&D investments of domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries (Un and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008 ).
Our theoretical model introduces the mechanism of host country R&D subsidies having a signaling effect for the quality of R&D performed at a subsidiary (Spence, 1973) , so that MNC subsidiaries with a subsidy are more likely to obtain or extend competence-creating mandates with the MNC resulting in increased R&D investments (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) . MNCs in that sense are distinct from domestic firms that could not use the subsidy as a signal to shift R&D investment internally. Moreover, we expect MNC subsidiaries to offer more opportunities for recombination with intra-MNC knowledge than domestic firms (Un and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008 ), leading to higher innovation performance. However, R&D subsidies may also divert attention towards the subsidized activity (Clarysse et al., 2009 ) which implies a comparatively lower innovation performance of the R&D investment that the MNC subsidiary would have undertaken anyway. Our empirical analysis uses longitudinal data on R&D investment, subsidies and innovation performance for a representative sample of 5,263 domestic firms and foreign MNC subsidiaries located in Germany to test the hypotheses. We combine a treatment model with the estimation of a knowledge production function and find broad support for our theoretical conjectures.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our research contributes to the growing literature on MNC knowledge and technology development which has been primarily concerned with R&D decisions in the network of subsidiaries (for an overview Cantwell, 2017) . It constitutes the first account of how MNC subsidiaries make decisions on R&D investment in response to R&D subsidies and how these decisions differ from comparable domestic firms. We explain these differences based on the nature of MNCs in distinction to domestic firms, i.e. based on an MNC's presence in multiple countries and the advantages that its access to other countries offer (Un and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) . In that sense, our research facilitates a better understanding of technology development in MNCs and highlights the role of signals that a subsidiary can send to the headquarters and other subsidiaries in order to receive an improved mandate as well as resources from the network. Existing studies ignoring the effect of host country subsidies on subsidiary R&D decisions and outcomes are likely to suffer from biases.
Second, we add to the literature on institutional theory by focusing our attention on technology policy, a hitherto neglected field of inquiry. R&D subsidies can be characterized as a key dimension of the institutional infrastructure for innovation that determines innovativeness (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004) . By examining the reactions of both domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries to the availability of R&D subsidies, our research provides a more nuanced understanding of when and under what circumstances subsidies influence R&D inputs and outputs. Given that innovation has become increasingly significant in today's economy, focusing on technology policy provides a more comprehensive picture on the role of institutions shaping the incentives and abilities required to implement particular innovation strategies (Holmes et al., 2016) .
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Technology policy and firm response
Government policy refers to various forms of governmental intervention aimed at promoting productive investments that would not have occurred in market interactions in which those interventions were absent. Interventions are assumed to be particularly valuable if they lead to positive externalities across industries and activities that autonomous decision making of firms would fail to account for (Lazzarini, 2015) . Technology policy, in that sense, builds on the idea that markets sometimes do not motivate firms to carry out the most economically and socially desirable innovation projects because (1) the financial returns are difficult for firms to capture, (2) firms do not command the required resources, and (3) the innovation outcomes are socially desirable and broadly shared (Bozeman, 2000; Holmes et al., 2016) . In other words, technology policy justifies government intervention by highlighting market failures caused by knowledge leakage and spillovers that prevent firms from fully appropriating the returns from innovation and therefore limits their incentives to invest into R&D (Arrow, 1962) . To compensate for the "underinvestment" that would occur as a consequence, governments worldwide have implemented R&D subsidy programs alongside other forms of intervention like tax credits, government contracts, and government-funded university research .
Technology policy, and R&D subsidies in particular, has frequently been characterized as important for firms since it may support firms' knowledge production and the combination of knowledge from diverse sources (Holmes et al., 2016) . Government funding for research hence facilitates product, process, and service innovation and fosters the creation of networks, new instruments and methods (Salter and Martin, 2001) . While governments often prioritize certain sectors or technologies, knowledge may spill over to other sectors and increase the potential for recombination and innovation in those sectors as well (Feldman and Kelley, 2006) .
Despite the benefits of R&D subsidies for individual firms seeking to acquire funding for their innovation projects, there has been a long standing debate about whether such subsidies are beneficial overall. Governments may not be able to select the most promising firms and innovation projects, industries or technologies due to information asymmetries, and R&D subsidies may narrow the scope of firms' search processes to areas which do not necessarily contain the most promising solutions to innovation problems but provide access to those subsidy programs (Ely, Van Zwanenberg, and Stirling, 2014) . Moreover, doubts have been expressed whether R&D subsidies are actually effective. A large number of studies embedded mainly in the economics literature has therefore applied econometric techniques to investigate the additionality of R&D subsidies in terms of inputs, outputs, and firm behavior (e.g., Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Gonzalez and Pazo, 2008; Jaffe and Le, 2015) .
Input additionality addresses the question whether a subsidy has the intended effect and motivates firms' continued efforts in R&D or whether the subsidy merely crowds out investment that would have been undertaken anyway, inhibiting a net increase in R&D. Subsidies may also increase the costs of finite R&D inputs and input providers such as R&D employees may appropriate a considerable share of the value of the subsidy . Prior literature has so far converged on the conclusion that the crowding-out effect is small (Clarysse et al., 2009 ). Yet the more interesting question is whether R&D subsidies also benefit innovation outcomes. In that sense, output additionality refers to the outcomes of the R&D process that could not have been attained without the R&D subsidy (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008) . The assessment of R&D outputs is complicated by measurement issues in that many other factors determine the success of innovation outcomes that hamper the attribution of outcomes to the receipt of a specific subsidy (Klette, Møen, and Griliches, 2000) . A possible way out, although somewhat distant from the actual commercialization success, is an evaluation of patent or publication outputs in response to a subsidy. Finally, recent literature has begun to focus on the learning effects that take place in firms as a result of a subsidy and has referred to these effects as behavioral additionality (Clarysse et al., 2009) . In sum, extant literature is suggestive of the benefits of R&D subsidies. However, without subsidy-induced changes in firm behavior government funding may simply redistribute the opportunities for innovation rather than increasing them overall.
R&D investment decisions of foreign MNC subsidiaries
The locational choices by MNCs for performing R&D activities have attracted considerable attention in prior literature (e.g., Contractor et al., 2010; Castellani, Jimenez, and Zanfei, 2013; Belderbos, Lokshin, and Sadowski, 2015) . While R&D performed in host countries has traditionally been seen as a requirement to adapt technologies and products to foreign markets and manufacturing conditions (Kuemmerle, 1997) , recent research stresses that R&D activities abroad may also facilitate knowledge sourcing and "reverse" knowledge transfer in order to increase an MNC's innovation performance and productivity in the home or other host countries (e.g., Alcácer and Chung, 2007; Belderbos, Lykogianni, and Veugelers, 2008; Chung and Yeaple, 2008; Song, Asakawa, and Chu, 2011; Alcácer, Dezső, and Zhao, 2013; Belderbos et al., 2015) .
In that sense, attention has shifted towards the MNC as a creator and developer of technologies across national boundaries (Cantwell, 2017) , putting emphasis on the competence-or capabilitybased view of the firm in analyzing the MNC (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2000) .
The role of MNCs has increasingly shifted towards facilitating connectivity between knowledge sources that are spatially dispersed (Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016) . Shared values and common social communities across the differentiated units of the MNC then smooth the transfer and exploitation of knowledge within the network (Kogut and Zander, 1993) . While the pattern of knowledge flows within the MNC leads to reciprocity between the more prominent subsidiaries, other subsidiaries may be left in a more isolated situation (Monteiro, Arvidsson, and Birkinshaw, 2008) . Although the diversity and differentiation of subsidiaries within the MNC facilitate learning and innovation, not all subsidiaries may therefore be able to successfully evolve towards competence-creating mandates since that ability also depends on status and influence that they can exercise within the MNC (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) .
The decision making authority for R&D investment has typically resided with the foreign headquarters of the MNC, yet the increased attention towards knowledge seeking implies greater decentralization in the management of R&D to capture "home-base augmenting" or "competence-creating" benefits in the host country location (Pearce and Singh, 1992; Kuemmerle, 1997 Kuemmerle, , 1998 Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) . This process may lead MNC subsidiaries to enjoy higher autonomy, in the form of autonomy formally delegated to the subsidiary through mandates or through "efficiency-focused autonomy" to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of knowledge sourcing vis-à-vis the headquarters (Cavanagh et al., 2017) . Particularly formal mandates involve higher R&D investment by the subsidiary in order to build up absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) and exploit location-specific advantages (Cantwell, 2017) . In that sense, headquarters optimize R&D investment across subsidiaries, and subsidiaries compete for competence-creating mandates and corresponding funding allocations. As a result, subsidiaries with a competence-creating mandate become themselves more engaged in knowledge-based interactions with the MNC parent and other sub-units in order to leverage the greater opportunities for knowledge recombination to facilitate innovation (Berry, 2014; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2015) .
Hypotheses
The relationship between MNC subsidiaries and the headquarters is typically characterized by information asymmetries. Headquarters associate uncertainty with the extent to which subsidiaries are actually capable of fulfilling a competence-creating mandate. As a result, subsidiary decisions on R&D investments are largely controlled by the headquarters that seek to optimize R&D investment across all subsidiaries in the MNC network. Kuemmerle (1997) argues that parent firms often demand coordination and control of foreign R&D activities in order to facilitate certain behavior. We suggest in the following that the receipt of an R&D subsidy can have a signaling effect for the quality of R&D at a subsidiary. Subsidiaries with a subsidy are therefore more likely to receive an increasingly explorative mandate and to spend more on R&D.
Signaling theory describes the process by which one party can credibly convey information about itself to another party in situations of information asymmetry (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011) . A credible signal needs to be both observable and costly to imitate (Ross, 1977) . Signaling theory has been applied in many different contexts, for example to explain why firms undergoing an initial public offering (IPO) seek a prestigious board structure (e.g., Certo, 2003) , or how firms use patents as signals for their research capability (e.g., Levitas and McFadyen, 2009) .
Similarly, R&D subsidies can signal research capability because they are typically awarded through funding competitions in which individual firms or consortia of organizations compete for the allocation of research funding in order to realize a certain R&D project (Olsen, Sofka, and Grimpe, 2016) . R&D subsidies are reliable or credible to the receiver of the signal because they correspond with the sought-after quality of the party sending the signal ("signal fit"). Conversely, a domestic firm could not use an R&D subsidy as a signal to shift R&D investment internally. In other words, R&D subsidies result in higher input additionality for MNC subsidiaries compared to domestic firms. We propose:
Hypothesis 1: Foreign MNC subsidiaries increase their R&D investments more when receiving host country R&D subsidies than comparable domestic firms.
Next, we argue that MNC subsidiaries are more likely to experience a productivity increase from the subsidy-induced R&D investment compared to domestic firms, i.e. MNC subsidiaries are also more likely to exhibit higher output additionality than comparable domestic firms. Specifically, we consider productivity increases in R&D that materialize in higher innovation performance of the subsidiary compared to domestic firms.
Our argument relies on the internal and external embeddedness of MNC subsidiaries in larger communities and networks (Song et al., 2011) . These networks have frequently been shown to exert significant influence on innovation and learning in MNCs (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1993; Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2001) . While internal embeddedness refers to the exchange of knowledge and adaptation of resources in the relationship between the subsidiary and the other units of the MNC, external embeddedness describes the network with research and engineering communities in the host location (Asakawa, 1996) . First, we suggest that the subsidy-induced R&D investment by the subsidiary will have a more positive effect on innovation performance than subsidy-induced R&D by comparable domestic firms because of the subsidiary's internal embeddedness. Based on the notion of MNCs as social communities which facilitate knowledge transfer and recombination within the MNC net-work (Kogut and Zander, 1993) , the patterns of knowledge flows within the MNC lead to reciprocity and enable a more comprehensive exploitation of newly acquired knowledge (Cantwell, 2017) . On the one hand, the embeddedness into an MNC network increases the knowledge pool available for recombination while, on the other hand, internal embeddedness grants access to more diverse knowledge elements that enhance the scope for new useful recombination (Katila and Ahuja, 2002) .
Second, subsidy-induced R&D investment by the subsidiary is likely to have a more positive effect on innovation performance than those investments by comparable domestic firms because of the subsidiary's external embeddedness. Similar to the signal that the receipt of a subsidy sends to the parent firm, R&D subsidies can signal quality and capabilities to actors in the host location that manifest in higher legitimacy and thus attractiveness as an interaction and collaboration partner. As a consequence, subsidized firms may get easier and repeated access to tacit knowledge embedded in local networks of scientific and engineering communities (Song et al., 2011) . While these benefits accrue to both domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries, it is likely that subsidiaries' innovation performance benefits more for two reasons. MNC subsidiaries can be assumed to be of higher attractiveness as an interaction and collaboration partner to local actors because they may offer opportunities to engage in distant search (Katila and Ahuja, 2002) . Moreover, MNC subsidiaries can make better use of the knowledge they acquire from external sources in the host location due to their internal embeddedness in the MNC network. Hence, our second hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis 2: The subsidy-induced R&D investment in a foreign MNC subsidiary increases innovation performance more than the subsidy-induced R&D investment in a comparable domestic firm.
Finally, we turn to the productivity effects of the subsidy-induced R&D investment vis-à-vis the counterfactual R&D investment that the subsidiary would have undertaken anyway. Specifically, we argue that the former will be higher than the latter. We attribute this effect to subsidiary evolution (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) in response to the support from the host country. In other words, we suggest that the host-country subsidy effectuates behavioral additionality in that it leads to learning effects within the firm. Subsidiaries have frequently been characterized as evolving over time by accumulating resources and developing specialized capabilities (e.g., Hedlund, 1986 ). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) argue that subsidiary evolution is driven by head-office assignments, the subsidiary's own choices, and the local environment. They suggest a cyclical process in which one determinant causes change in another, leading to transformations in the subsidiary's role over time. In that sense, head-office assignments typically determine subsidiary evolution in the early stages of the process, particularly when the subsidiary's resources and capabilities are not too advanced. Subsidiaries then evolve oftentimes through their own initiative toward more sophisticated and higher value-added R&D activities. Furthermore, the local environment shapes subsidiary evolution: Hood, Young, and Lal (1994) , for example, document how government agencies help existing subsidiaries improve their activities. In sum, this evolutionary process can bring about the development of specialized capabilities on which the MNC network is dependent. As a result, it is reflected in the subsidiary's charter which describes the shared understanding between the subsidiary and the headquarters about the scope and responsibilities of the subsidiary's activities (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) .
We suggest that the receipt of an R&D subsidy offers opportunities for the subsidiary to change the direction of its R&D activities. Because of information asymmetry between the headquarters and the subsidiary, R&D subsidies that subsidiaries have strived to obtain can signal the ambition to receive a new mandate. Head office managers can be assumed to be risk averse in their decisions about which responsibilities to delegate, and subsidiaries that receive R&D subsidies can credibly demonstrate the search for new market and technological opportunities and the ambition to develop the required capabilities for their pursuit through the subsidized R&D (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) . The improved mandate, particularly if it is associated with the development of capabilities that the rest of the MNC is dependent on to a higher degree, likely increases the attention that the subsidiary will get and in turn also the access to resources from the MNC network. This increases the potential for recombination and therefore also innovation performance while these productivity effects cannot be expected to occur for a subsidiary's counterfactual R&D activities that the subsidiary would have engaged in without the R&D subsidy. As a consequence, our third hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis 3: The subsidy-induced R&D investment in a foreign MNC subsidiary increases innovation performance more than the R&D investment that the MNC subsidiary would have undertaken anyway.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
We test our theoretical predictions by utilizing a merged dataset combining data from a representative innovation survey of firms in Germany with patent statistics from the European Patent Office (EPO). The survey data stem from the "Mannheim Innovation Panel" (MIP) which is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Union. In contrast with many other CIS surveys, MIP is conducted annually and allows the construction of an unbalanced firm panel dataset. MIP respondents are responsible for innovation topics in their firms with titles such as CEO, head of R&D department or innovation management. These respondents are asked to provide answers to a comprehensive set of questions about innovation inputs as well as outputs and assign importance ratings (Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter, 2005) .
MIP provides a stratified random sample which is representative for firms in Germany. Non-response analyses show no systematic distortions between responding and non-responding firms (Rammer et al., 2005) .
CIS surveys have been used frequently in recent leading management journal publications (e.g. Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Wadhwa, Bodas Freitas, and Sarkar, 2017) and benefit from a range of quality features. First, CIS methodology and questionnaires comply directly with the Oslo manual of the OECD for measuring innovation (OECD, 2005) . Response accuracy benefits from the use of examples and detailed definitions. Second, the CIS survey process emphasizes interpretability, reliability and validity through pre-tests and pilot studies (Laursen and Salter, 2006) . Given that CIS surveys have been conducted for more than a decade in the European Union, the process benefits from experience effects spanning countries, industries and firms. Third, items of the questionnaire are routinely reviewed by scientific advisory boards. Eurostat (2009) considers CIS data from Germany as high quality. with missing values, we obtain a dataset with 5,717 firm observations, 5,623 of these can be matched with control firms (see estimation approach below) and will be used for testing our theoretical predictions. 9.7% of these observations stem from subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (see variable definition below).
Variables
Dependent Variable
Our theoretical framework has two major components. Hypothesis 1 predicts changes in R&D investments that are induced by host government subsidies, while hypotheses 2 and 3 predict the outcomes of these subsidy-induced R&D investments on innovation performance. Accordingly, we use two dependent variables. We use firm's R&D expenditures reported in the survey as dependent variable for testing hypothesis 1.
For testing hypotheses 2 and 3, we use the number of a focal firm's EPO patent applications in the subsequent five years. Patent statistics have frequently been used to measure the innovation performance of MNC subsidiaries (e.g. Blomkvist, Kappen, and Zander, 2010) . They have the advantage that patent offices define and assess the minimum degree of novelty of an innovation qualifying for patent protection ('innovative step') (Encaoua, Guellec, and Martinez, 2006) . Hence, patented innovations can be compared across organizations based on this shared standard.
Concerning the five-year time frame, there is a significant time delay between investing in R&D and arriving at a patentable innovation. Lengthy patent filing procedures add to these delays.
Then again, very long time windows for measuring patent outcomes increase the risk that confounding factors occur in between. We use therefore a five-year time window for estimating our main models and conduct consistency check estimations using shorter time windows (see details in section 'consistency checks' below).
Explanatory Variables
Our central independent variable of interest is whether a firm in our sample is a subsidiary of a foreign MNC. We identify these firms based on a dummy variable for firms indicating that they are part of a company group with headquarters abroad in line with previous research on the innovation activities of foreign MNC subsidiaries (Sofka, Shehu, and de Faria, 2014) .
For testing hypotheses 2 and 3, we include an independent variable for the amount of R&D investment that was induced by host country government subsidies. Respondents indicate in the innovation survey whether they have received an R&D subsidy from the German government (state and/or federal level). We rely on a matching approach (see the detailed methodological explanation below under 'empirical approach') to separate the subsidy-induced R&D investment from the amount of R&D investment that a firm would have undertaken anyway, i.e. the counterfactual R&D investment in the absence of the government subsidy. The counterfactual R&D investment is also included in the estimation model.
We include additional control variables to capture other factors which could potentially affect firm's innovation performance. First, we control for firms that are part of a domestic MNC by adding a control variable for firms indicating that they are part of a company group with headquarters in Germany. This implies that domestic firms are the reference group in all estimations. Second, we take into account that firms differ in their resource endowments based on their size (number of employees in logs) as well as age (number of years since foundation in Germany). Third, we control for differences in firms' innovation capacities. We control for a firm's patent applications in the year of observation since these innovations are likely to predate the R&D that was induced by a government subsidy. We add a dummy variable for whether the firm engages in R&D continuously. This variable is frequently used to indicate the presence of a dedicated R&D department. We control for the degree of internationalization through the share of ex-ports in firm sales since internationalization has been found to affect a firm's innovation activities (Cassiman and Golovko, 2011) . Additionally, we include a dummy variable for whether a firm engages in process innovation since such activities may affect its ability to patent.
Fourth, we control for potential time and industry-level effects by including four year dummy variables (the year 2000 serves as the reference group) and five industry dummy variables based on grouped two-digit NACE codes which have been used frequently in previous innovation studies (Grimpe et al., 2017) . The industry dummies encompass medium high-tech manufacturing (e.g., motor vehicles), high-tech manufacturing (e.g. medical devices), distributive services (e.g. logistics), knowledge-intensive services (e.g. consulting) as well as technological services (e.g. software production). Low-tech manufacturing will serve as the reference group. Appendix 1 provides the detailed industry codes and classification.
Finally, we control for any other potential factor influencing patent activity by including the patent application of firms in the three years preceding our sample, i.e. 1997 , 1998 and 1999 , following Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (2002 (see empirical approach below for methodological considerations of including pre-sample information).
Empirical Approach
We combine a treatment model with a knowledge production function to test our hypotheses following Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) who study additionality effects of government subsidies on R&D investments as well as innovation outcomes. We extend their model by investigating the particular effects for foreign MNC subsidiaries.
Treatment Model
We rely on a treatment model to estimate the degree to which a firm's R&D investment was induced by an R&D subsidy. Implicit in this notion is the idea that the focal firm would have made at least some R&D investments if it had not received the subsidy, i.e. there is a counterfactual R&D investment that is not readily observable. Hence, a firm's actual R&D investment can be split up into a counterfactual R&D investment and a subsidy-induced R&D part. Hypothesis 1 would be supported if the subsidy-induced R&D of foreign MNC subsidiaries is significantly larger than the one for domestic firms.
We apply a matching estimator to establish the effect of a subsidy (i.e. the treatment) on R&D investment. Matching estimation takes into account that the receipt of a subsidy is not random, i.e. some firms are more likely than others to apply for subsidies and some applications are more likely to be granted. Matching approaches have been frequently used in the literature to assess the effects of R&D subsidies (see Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014 , for a recent review) and receive increasing attention in International Business research (Chang and Chung, 2017 , provide a review).
Matching estimators rely on observable characteristics to match each treated firm, i.e. subsidy recipients, with a comparable control firm, thereby creating a quasi-experimental setting. A comparison between such matched treated and control firms would not suffer from selection biases (Heckman et al., 1998) and the difference in R&D investment between a subsidized firm and its matched control can be interpreted as induced by the subsidy.
In line with most matching studies, we rely on propensity score matching in which we estimate the propensity for a firm to receive a subsidy based on observable characteristics using a probit estimation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . Subsequently, we match treated and control 2 Ideally, we would like to use the amount of the R&D subsidy but this information is not available to us. Most studies on R&D additionality share this data imperfection with our analysis. firms based on the propensity score and test whether there are any remaining significant differences between the matched pairs, i.e. the matched sample is balanced. To achieve a balanced match we impose common support by dropping the 5% of treated observations for which the density of control observations is the lowest, i.e. it is increasingly unlikely to find good matches (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 , provide an overview of matching choices). We use the following variables in line with previous literature to predict the propensity for a firm to receive an R&D subsidy: two dummy variables for whether the firm is part of a foreign or domestic MNC respectively, firm size (number of employees in logs), firm age in years since founding, patent stock in logs, exports as a share of sales, five industry group dummies (described above) and four year dummies (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006) .
Following this matching procedure, we can describe the counterfactual R&D investment of a subsidized firm as its matched non-subsidized control firm. We subtract the counterfactual R&D investment of a subsidized firm from its actual R&D investment and obtain the subsidy-induced R&D investment. For non-subsidized firms, counterfactual R&D investment equals actual R&D investment and subsidy-induced R&D investment equals zero. Hypothesis 1 is supported if the subsidy-induced R&D investment of foreign MNC subsidiaries is significantly larger than the one of domestic firms.
3
Knowledge Production Function
We use the matched sample of 5,263 firm observations obtained in the first step of the analysis to estimate a knowledge production function predicting patent applications over the next five years.
This dependent variable requires some consideration on the estimation strategy. First, the dependent variable is a count variable and overdispersed (mean=0.62, standard deviation=4.45).
We conduct a likelihood ratio test for whether Poisson regressions or negative binomial models are more appropriate. The test rejects the former (alpha=3.96, P>chibar2=0.00).
Second, many firms in our sample do not patent which could make zero-inflated negative binomial regressions more appropriate. We conduct the test suggested by Vuong (1989) and find support for zero inflation (z=3.21, P>z=0.00). Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions require the definition of a condition determining the observation of zero counts. Arundel and Kabla (1998) show that patent propensity is determined by the technological and institutional conditions of a firm's industry. We capture these industry differences by calculating the share of firms in an industry (two-digit NACE) that has filed for EPO patent applications prior to our estimation sample between 1995 and 1999, based on the representative innovation survey for Germany.
Finally, unobserved factors may exist that influence both independent as well as dependent variables in our estimations. Given the unbalanced nature of our panel data, we cannot simply include firm fixed effects. However, including pre-sample information of the dependent variable allows controlling for unobserved, firm-specific factors going beyond a simple dummy variable (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007; Lach and Schankerman, 2008) . Salomon and Jin (2010) apply this approach to patent statistics and use a three year time window. We follow this approach and include patent application of firms in the three years preceding our sample, i.e. 1997, 1998 and 1999.
We use multiplicative interaction terms for testing hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 is supported if the interaction effect between subsidy-induced R&D investment and foreign MNC is positive and significant. Hypothesis 3 receives support if the interaction effect between subsidyinduced R&D investment and foreign MNC is significantly larger than the interaction effect between counterfactual R&D investment and foreign MNC.
Robustness Checks
We conduct a number of consistency checks for probing the stability of our findings. First, we test whether results are sensitive to the choice of matching estimator. Matching estimations can be inefficient when they only take information from the nearest neighbor control observation into account. We repeat the matching procedure using a Gaussian kernel matching procedure as an alternative approach. Kernel matching does not rely on an individual control observations for each treated firm but uses the weighted average of all control observations (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . Differences in the propensity score between a treated firm and control observations serve as weights and the kernel distribution determines how averages are calculated.
Second, as discussed in the description of the dependent variable, we assume for the main model specifications of the regression analysis that it takes firms five years to turn R&D investments (subsidized or otherwise) into an invention and patent it. Confounding factors may influence patenting during this time period. Hence, we repeat all zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses using patenting in the subsequent four as well as three years respectively.
Finally, significant effects may be driven by the fact that firms in our sample are MNCs but not necessarily that they are foreign ones. To eliminate such potential biases, we estimate the zero-inflated negative binomial regression models and include interaction terms of R&D (both subsidized and counterfactual) with domestic MNCs as well. This allows a comparison between interaction effects with foreign as well as domestic MNCs. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our dataset. Firms spend on average € 329,184 (4.5% of their sales) on R&D and 33% of them have received an R&D subsidy from state or federal governments. They are on average 24 years old and have 183 employees. 36% of their sales originate from exports. 31% of firms operate in low or medium tech manufacturing sectors, 19% in medium high-tech manufacturing. 9.6% of firms are part of a foreign MNC while 10.2% are part of a domestic MNC, i.e. headquartered in Germany. We inspect the data for multicollinearity based on pair-wise correlations (see Table 2 ) as well as variance inflation factors (VIF) and find no indication (largest VIF: 1.64, mean VIF: 1.37). 4 Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 show the respective descriptive and correlation statistics for the matched sample entering the estimation of the knowledge production function. We also test for the presence of common method bias using Harman's one-factor test. The test does not signal common method bias.
RESULTS
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Results of the Treatment Model
We estimate the probability of a firm for receiving an R&D subsidy by using a probit model. This estimation will subsequently be used to predict the propensity scores for obtaining an R&D subsidy for all firms whether they have actually received an R&D subsidy or not. Table 3 shows the results of the probit estimation.
[Insert Table 3 about here] Subsidiaries of both foreign and domestic MNCs have a significantly lower probability (99% level) for receiving an R&D subsidy. Calculating the marginal effects, the probability for receiv- 4 We perform zero-inflated negative binomial regressions using the sample of 5,263 observations that can be matched. This sample has slightly lower variance inflation factors, the maximum reaching 1.60 and the mean 1.32.
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A principal component analysis of all model variables identifies eight factors with an eigenvalue greater than one with a maximum of 15 percent of the variance explained by a single factor. Hence, there is no indication for common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). ing an R&D subsidy is 9.2% lower for foreign MNCs and 8.4% lower for domestic MNCs. However, there is no significant difference between the estimated coefficients of these two groups (p>0.75). The probit estimation shows also several other factors which significantly influence the probability for receiving R&D subsidies. The probability for receiving an R&D subsidy significantly increases for younger firms, with increasing patent stocks and export intensity (all significant at 99% level). There are also differences between industries. Firms in medium high-tech and high-tech manufacturing as well as technological service sectors have significantly higher probabilities (99% level) for receiving R&D subsidies. Firms in distributive (e.g. logistics) and knowledge-intensive services (e.g. consulting) have significantly lower probabilities (99% level) for receiving R&D subsidies. These patterns can emerge because of differences in the technological needs and opportunities of firms or based on subsidy programs targeting particular firms (e.g. new ventures) or sectors.
We use the probit model to predict propensity scores for each firm observation of receiving an R&D subsidy. Subsequently, we implement the nearest neighbor matching described in the empirical approach and match each treated firm which had received an R&D subsidy with a control firm that had the most similar propensity score but did not receive a subsidy. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest a number of steps to verify the quality of the matching procedure. Most importantly, we test for remaining, significant differences between treated and control firms across all independent variables that we had used in the probit estimation. Appendix 2 shows de- For testing hypothesis 1 we apply a mean comparison t-test using bootstrapped standard errors. We test whether subsidy-induced R&D investment is significantly different for subsidiaries of foreign MNCs compared to domestic firms. This test is supported with a significance level of 99%. The average subsidy-induced R&D investment for foreign MNC subsidiaries is € 809,060 (s.e. 257,728) compared to € 137,614 (s.e. 36,269) for the average domestic firm. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. We repeat the t-test using domestic MNCs as reference group with subsidyinduced R&D investments of € 360,498. While the subsidy effect is still nominally stronger for foreign MNCs, the difference in subsidy-induced R&D investment is not significantly different compared with domestic MNCs (80% level).
Results from the Knowledge Production Function Model
We estimate a knowledge production function utilizing counterfactual and subsidy-induced R&D investments obtained in the matching procedure. We estimate zero-inflated negative binomial regression models predicting patent applications in the subsequent five years. Table 4 shows the results.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We rely on the patent propensity of a focal firm's industry (share of firms with patent application 1995-1999) to predict zero patent applications within our zero-inflated negative binomial model. This variable is consistently negative and significant at the 99% level, i.e. indicating that firms in industries with high patent propensity are less likely to experience zero patent applications. We introduce the variables of interest for testing our hypotheses stepwise. Model 1 contains all control variables. For testing hypothesis 2, we include the interaction term between foreign MNC and subsidy-induced R&D investment in model 2. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 97% level. The 95% confidence interval is strictly positive between 0.02 and 0.38. This result lends support to hypothesis 2 which predicts that subsidy-induced R&D investment in subsidiaries of foreign MNCs will have a higher effect on innovation performance than in a comparable domestic firm.
We include an additional interaction effect in model 3 for testing hypothesis 3. The added interaction multiplies foreign MNC with counterfactual R&D. The coefficient of this interaction is negative and significant at the 95% level. Its 95% confidence interval is strictly negative ranging from -0.008 to -0.53. Hypothesis 3 would be supported if the coefficient of the interaction of foreign MNC with subsidy-induced R&D would be significantly larger than for the interaction with counterfactual R&D. The main effect of the interaction with subsidy-induced R&D remains positive and significant in model 3, albeit at the 93% level. We conduct a Wald test for equality of the coefficients of the two interaction terms. The test rejects equality with a significance level of 99% (chi2=8.30). Hence, we find support for hypothesis 3 which postulates that the subsidyinduced R&D investment in foreign MNC subsidiaries has a larger effect on innovation performance than the R&D investment that the subsidiary would have undertaken in the absence of the subsidy.
Focusing on the control variables in the models, we find that subsidy-induced as well as counterfactual R&D do on average not significantly increase patent applications in the subsequent five years. However, many structural features of firms have positive significant effects. Patent applications increase significantly with firm size and age as well as with being part of a domestic MNC. Similarly, export intensity increases patent applications. Firms engaging in continuous R&D as well as with patent applications in the year of the observation are also significantly more likely to increase their patent applications. Process innovations lower a firm's patent applications significantly. We find similar industry effects on patent activity as previous studies (e.g. Arundel and Kabla, 1998) . Firms in medium and high-tech manufacturing as well as in technological services have significantly more patent applications. Finally, the pre-sample information about patent applications three years prior to our observation period is positive and significant, indicating that firm-specific, otherwise unobserved factors increase the number of patent applications.
Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness check estimations to demonstrate the consistency of our results.
All results are available from the authors upon request if not referenced differently. First, we use an alternative matching estimator by relying on Gaussian kernel matching. Kernel matching uses all control observations and uses the propensity score for calculating a weighted average which can be compared to treated firms. We rely on the same propensity score estimates as for the nearest neighbor matching and can also obtain a balanced sample with no remaining significant difference between treated firms and matched controls after matching (Appendix 3 provides details). We calculate subsidy-induced R&D investments and test whether the effect is stronger for foreign MNCs using a mean-comparison test with bootstrapped standard errors (mean difference € 802,846; s.e. 324,441). We find support at the 98% significance level. Hence, matching results are consistent with our main models for testing hypothesis 1.
Second, we repeat all zero-inflated negative binomial regressions taking only patent applications as dependent variable into account that occur in the subsequent 3 and 4 years. While shorter time periods reduce the odds of confounding factors occurring in the meantime, they also reduce the odds of capturing patent applications originating from subsidy-induced R&D taking more time to develop. Appendix 6 shows the equivalent regression tables to models 2 and 3 from the main models. All predicted relationships in hypotheses 2 and 3 remain consistently supported.
Finally, we test to what degree the effects of subsidized and counterfactual R&D on innovation performance would equally apply to subsidiaries of foreign and domestic MNCs. We create analogous interaction terms and re-estimate zero-inflated negative binomial regressions using the specification of our main models.
Appendix 7 shows the results. We find no significant interaction effects of domestic MNC with neither subsidy-induced R&D nor counterfactual R&D. The respective interaction effects with foreign MNC remain, however, fully consistent with the main models. We conclude that our hypothesized relationships are specific to subsidiaries of foreign MNCs and cannot be generalized to all MNC subsidiaries.
DISCUSSION
Adding to the literature on how host country policy influences MNC behavior and activities, this research examines the role that host country technology policy, particularly R&D subsidies, plays in motivating MNC subsidiaries to expand their activities towards innovation and exploration. Based on longitudinal data on R&D investment, subsidies and innovation performance for a representative sample of 5,263 domestic firms and foreign MNC subsidiaries located in Germany, our research indicates that host country R&D subsidies increase R&D investment more in MNC subsidiaries compared to domestic firms, that R&D subsidies also increase innovation performance more for MNC subsidiaries, and that R&D subsidies redirect innovation activities in MNC subsidiaries in that the subsidy induced R&D is associated with higher innovation performance compared to the R&D that the subsidiaries would have carried out without the subsidy. In that sense, our research provides a systematic account of how host country technology policy influences multinational firms' innovation activities, a hitherto neglected area compared to the vast literature on host country institutions which define the "rules of the game" for MNC activity (North, 1990; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2012) . Thus, focusing on technology policy we provide a more comprehensive picture on the role of institutions shaping the incentives and abilities required to implement particular innovation strategies (Holmes et al., 2016) .
Our research indicates that MNC subsidiaries are distinct from domestic firms in their reaction to host country R&D subsidies which we attribute to the nature of MNCs in distinction to domestic firms, i.e. the presence of MNCs in multiple countries and the advantages that the access to other countries offer (Un and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) . In that regard, our theoretical reasoning is based on an integration of mechanisms from the literature on additionality effects of R&D subsidies (e.g., Blanes and Busom, 2004; Clarysse et al., 2009 ) with theory on MNC subsidiary R&D decisions (e.g., Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Un and CuervoCazurra, 2008; Santangelo et al., 2016) . We suggest that MNC subsidiaries can use subsidies as a signal towards the headquarters in order to receive a new or extended competence-creating mandate that stresses innovation and exploration (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) . As a result, MNC subsidiaries not only spend comparatively more on R&D but they are also able to turn this investment into performance more effectively.
Hence, our research answers a question that is important at a theoretical level because theories on R&D additionality require qualification in the context of comparing MNCs with domestic firms, adding to prior literature that has investigated differences in the R&D investments of domestic firms and MNC subsidiaries (Un and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) . In particular, we introduce the idea that host country subsidies can function as a signal that can be used by MNC subsidiaries to an extent it could not be used by domestic firms. Our research therefore facilitates a better understanding of technology development in MNCs and suggests that studies ignoring the effect of host country subsidies on subsidiary R&D decisions and outcomes are likely to suffer from biases.
Our research holds important implications for both management and government policy.
Managers of MNC subsidiaries not only need to be aware of the -oftentimes -plentiful opportunities to acquire government funding for R&D activities but also to better understand the behavior of domestic competitors in funding competitions. This includes considerations about an "acceptable" degree of opportunistic behavior when deciding on the subsidy-induced R&D investment without jeopardizing the chances of being awarded a subsidy in the future. Most research to date suggests that there is no or only partial crowding out of R&D investments that firms would have undertaken anyway (e.g., Jaffe and Le, 2015) , and our research provides further indications that managers use R&D subsidies to advance their firm's competitiveness by enabling new technology development, patent application, and new product introduction. R&D subsidies in that sense seem to be part of a long term strategy by MNCs to benefit from research carried out at the subsidiary's location.
Moreover, our research is important for policy makers to understand the reaction of different types of firms to R&D subsidies and what can be expected from MNC subsidiaries with regard to R&D investment in the host country. Increasing the R&D activities within subsidiaries also increases the pool of knowledge within a host country which may eventually spill over to domestic firms. Hence, governments should have strong incentives to encourage R&D investments by foreign MNC subsidiaries to facilitate knowledge spillovers to domestic firms as a by-product (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While we believe our research to make an important contribution to the study of host country technology policy, several limitations have to be taken into account that in turn provide ample opportunities for further research. In that sense, we are constrained in our econometric modeling by the possibilities to actually observe the size of the R&D subsidy and how often subsidies were received. Moreover, we have no further information about the funding bodies allocating the R&D subsidies, except for a distinction between state and federal levels, and the thematic focus of the subsidy. It would be interesting to study differences in subsidies provided for more basic or more applied research as these might impact the incentives of firms to work with these subsidies. 
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